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I. INTRODUCTION
What would Grotius see as major challenges for international law
and its practitioners in our time? How would he approach them?
How would he balance beautiful theory and ugly fact? Heritage and
heresy? What lessons does he teach us in dealing with our tasks
today?1
I will be looking back not just to the early seventeenth century, but
also over the past fifty years. In 1965, I came to this meeting for the
first time, travelling from Cambridge, Massachusetts, in a
1. *Emeritus Professor, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.
For the life of Hugo Grotius, see the justly acclaimed biography by HENK NELLEN,
HUGO GROTIUS: A LIFELONG STRUGGLE FOR PEACE IN CHURCH AND STATE, 15831645 2 (J.C. Grayson trans., 2007); see also JACOB TER MEULEN & P. J. J.
DIERMANSE, BIBLIOGRAPHIE DES ÉCRITS IMPRIMÉS DE HUGO GROTIUS 820 (1950).
The first items are from 1595 when the author was just twelve!
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Greyhound bus with Peter Trooboff. In the course of the last fifty
years, I have been an observer and occasional participant in the
application and development of international law in the face of major
change and challenge, to refer to the theme of this conference. To
mention one matter to which I will return, in 1960, as I began as a
junior lawyer in the New Zealand Department of External Affairs,
the second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was
assembling. It will be recalled that it narrowly failed to adopt a
provision for a six-mile territorial sea and a further six-mile
exclusive fisheries zone.2 New Zealand, a few years later, adopted a
twelve-mile fishing zone. Japan challenged the extension and
proposed that the matter be taken to the International Court of Justice
(“Court” or “ICJ”). Instead, a phase out agreement was reached.3
There were already much more extensive claims, notably the 200mile claims to a “patrimonial sea” made by Chile, Ecuador, and Peru,
and the practice relating to the continental shelf was developing
apace.4
Four hundred years ago, give or take a few years, we find Hugo
Grotius in the early 1600s addressing law of the sea issues as counsel
for the Dutch East Indies Company in the admiralty or prize court in
Amsterdam in a dispute arising from the seizure by a ship of the
Company of a Portuguese galleon in the straits of Malacca, in 1613
in London. He was appointed as Pensionary of Rotterdam when he
was just twenty-four. He negotiated in Latin with James I of England
about fisheries and much broader matters of trade in the East Indies
and, in 1615, again in London, negotiated over whaling around
Spitsbergen.5 He was already a renowned author, especially on
2. Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official
Records, Summary Records of Plenary Meetings and of Meetings of the
Committee of the Whole, 29-30, 170-71, 173 (1960).
3. 683 U.N.T.S. 53 (1967). Compare the terms of the agreement reached by
the two States just 11 years later when New Zealand, as the States recognized in
the preamble, had “established in accordance with the relevant principles of
international law” a 200 mile exclusive economic zone. Japanese fishing boats
were to receive part of the unused total allowable catch. 1167 U.N.T.S. 441.
4. See eg., the legislation and other state practice reviewed by the Parties and
the Court in Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile), Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. Reps 1 (Jan.
27).
5. See eg., the extracts in GROTIUS READER 119-41, 160-63 (L.E. van Holk &
C. G. Roelofsen eds. 1973).
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matters of theology, and a poet. But from that time, it is his treatise
on the law of prize, De Jure Praedae, or rather one chapter of it, that
is relevant for my purpose. The treatise was prepared as a brief for
the Dutch East Indies Company. The famous chapter, Mare Liberum,
was published anonymously in 1608 and was used by the English in
the 1613 negotiations. They quoted from the writings of the “assertor
Maris Liberi” (the negotiations, written as well as oral, were largely
in Latin), taking a passage from the last paragraph of chapter 8 to the
effect that freedom of trade is based on a primitive right of nations
which has a natural and permanent cause that is part of the law of
nature rather than the positivist law of nations.6 The argument may
also be made that the legal underpinning which he gave to the role of
the Dutch East Indies Company facilitated Abel Tasman’s voyage
thirty-five years later around the west and southern coasts of
Australia and the first European discovery and mapping of New
Zealand.

II. THE VARIOUS ROLES OF GROTIUS THE
LAWYER
By the time he is thirty, Hugo Grotius has already prepared an
important work on international law of large continuing influence—
as Professor Ernest Nys, an early honorary member of this Society,
declared, “in this battle of books,” Grotius “had the better” of
Johannes Selden, “his English antagonist.” Grotius has undertaken
work as an advocate; he has been appointed to two major public
offices; and he has had a significant role in diplomatic negotiations,
although with some questioning his effectiveness in that role. When
we look across those roles, it is the writing of Mare Liberum that is
by far the most important for international law and international
lawyers—taken as an independent scholarly work when it was in fact
part of a brief for the Dutch East Indies Company.

6. HAMILTON VREELAND, JR., HUGO GROTIUS: THE FATHER OF THE MODERN
SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 82, 130 (“[F]reedom of trade is based on a
primitive right of nations which has a natural and permanent cause; and so that
right cannot be destroyed, or at all events it may not be destroyed except by the
consent of all nations. So far is that from being the case, that any one nation may
justly oppose in any way, any other two nations that desire to enter into a mutual
and exclusive contractual relation.”).
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As is well known, the remaining three decades of Grotius’ life had
amazing twists and turns in high office, as pensionary, in politics and
religion, as a person accused and convicted of sedition and sentenced
to life imprisonment, his study and writing in the Castle of
Lowenstein for two years, notably his Introduction to the
Jurisprudence of Holland,7 his escape in a book box, his time in
Paris and Hamburg, and his ten years as Ambassador of Sweden in
Paris, but it is De Jure Belli ac Pacis that is the immortal part of him,
or at least the major part of that immortal part. Its continuing
immeasurable impact flatly denies his last words, words of despair:
“[b]y undertaking many things I have accomplished nothing.”8
In his Prolegomena to that great work, Grotius said that “devotion
to study in private life was the only course open to [him, given that
he had been] undeservedly forced out from [his] native land which
had been graced by so many of [his] labours.”9 He was now
contributing “somewhat” to the philosophy of law, which previously
in public service he had practiced with the utmost degree of probity
of which he was capable.10 One message which the life of Grotius
and of a number of more recent leading international lawyers teaches
me is the value of changing hats—of having time as a scholar, as a
practitioner, private and public, in law reform work and in litigation,
as counsel or arbitrator or judge. The whole is other than the sum of
its parts. A related message is that it may well be that scholarly work
lasts the longest. I stress the “may,” but recall Oliver Wendell
Holmes’ marvellous reference to the secret isolated joy of the thinker
that, a hundred years after they are dead and forgotten, people who
7. Professor R. W. Lee in his 1930 Annual Lecture on a Master Mind at the
British Academy (proceedings Vol. XVI) says of the Introduction that it is a
masterpiece of condensed exposition. It is at once a treatise on jurisprudence and a
statement of positive law, the concatenation of the two being artfully contrived.
While the newly constituted Kingdom of the Netherlands entered into an era of
codified law in the early nineteenth century, the Introduction is still held in regard
in those parts of the British Empire which have retained or adopted the old Dutch
law as the foundation of their legal system (South Africa, the three protectorates
and Southern Rhodesia, Ceylon, and British Guiana).
8. See W. S. M. KNIGHT, THE LIFE AND WORKS OF HUGO GROTIUS 289
(1925).
9. HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 9 (Stephen C. Neff ed.,
2012) [hereinafter GROTIUS, WAR AND PEACE].
10. Id.
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have never heard of him will be moving to the measure of their
thoughts,—the subtle rapture of a postponed power.11 And here we
are speaking of 400 years! The example shown by Grotius also
makes the point about the importance of governments having good
lawyers. Good legal work should help structure and complement
good policy advice in the public sector.

III. THE ENDURING VALUES OF GROTIUS’ WORK
What do I see in that writing that is of enduring value in
addressing the challenges the world faces today? I will have to be
very selective. In the Prolegomena, Grotius highlights two central
matters.12 While acknowledging his predecessors, especially Gentilis,
he is the first, he says, to treat the whole of the argument: his topic is
the law which governs the “mutual relations among states or rulers of
states (inter populos plures aut populorum), whether derived from
nature, or established by divine ordinances, or having its origin in
custom (moribus) and tacit agreement . . . .”13 The enduring influence
of great scholars who treat the whole of a body, in this case, of
international law, is not measurable. But I am sure that it is the
experience of many of us that the understanding of a particular
matter may be greatly enhanced if we step back and see it in its more
general context. That is a third message. To move away from
international law for a moment, when considering the concept of
property in a New Zealand case, in one particular area of statutory
law, William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England,
notably his structure, helped me well along the way and to see the
particular in its context. His books were rights of persons, rights of
things, private wrongs, and public wrongs.14 That structuring,
contextual role of the great scholar may even be seen in terms of
paragraphs (c) and (d) of article 38(1) of the Court’s Statute, as
principles or teachings, but certainly not as subsidiary. Should we
11. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Profession of the Law, in THE HOLMES
READER 99, 101 (Julius J. Marke ed., 2d ed. 1955).
12. See GROTIUS, WAR AND PEACE, supra note 9, at 1 (focusing on the mutual
legal relations between ancient states and Rome and the resolution of controversies
that arose between them).
13. Id.
14. See Z v. Z [1997] 2 NZLR 258 at 278 (CA N.Z.) (listing Blackstone’s
treatise).
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not, more often, heed what Matthew Arnold said of Sophocles:
“[w]ho saw life steadily, and saw it whole”?15
The other matter Grotius emphasizes at the outset goes to
substance, to a central issue of any legal system. It was most certain,
he said, that “there is among nations a common law of Rights which
is of force with regard to war, and in war . . . .”16 But:
I saw prevailing throughout the Christian world a licence in making war
of which even barbarous nations would have been ashamed; recourse
being had to arms for slight reasons or no reason; and when arms were
once taken up all reverence for divine and human law was thrown away,
as if men were thenceforth authorized to commit all crimes without
restraint.17

That common law of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, his vigorous
differentiation between just and unjust wars, and his flat rejection of
private wars, were to be found, to return to his more general
formulation and to the full title of the treatise, in “the law of nature
and of nations as well as the principal questions of public law,” by
which he meant constitutional and criminal law. He did not draw fine
lines between international law and national law. A fourth lesson
here is that the law controlling resort to armed force should not be
seen as recent, as dating, say from as late as 1928.

IV. THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW:
BETTER IMPLEMENTATION
Hersch Lauterpacht in his great article entitled The Grotian
Tradition in International Law,18 building on the first brief passage I
have quoted and on more besides, lists as the first of the treatise’s
principal and characteristic features that the totality of international
15. Matthew Arnold, To a Friend, in MATHEW ARNOLD: THE COMPLETE
POEMS 1 (2012).
16. PERCY BORDWELL, THE LAW OF WAR BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS: A
HISTORY AND COMMENTARY 30 (1994).
17. Lord MacMillan et al., Grotius Commemoration, 24 TRANSACTIONS
GROTIUS SOC’Y xxix, xxxi (1938).
18. (1946) 23 BYIL 1, reprinted in 2 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL
LAW, THE COLLECTED PAPERS 207 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed. 1975). Elihu
Lauterpacht records in that volume that “from conversations which my father had
with me he regarded this article as probably the most important one that he ever
wrote. Certainly I can remember the immense amount of labour he put into it.” Id.
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relations is subject to the rule of law. That is the fifth lesson I draw.
Similar statements have been made by the U.N. General Assembly,
for instance, in its recent declaration on the rule of law.19 But what
does that mean in a practical sense? To take one central matter, if the
State is subject to the international rule of law should it not also be
subject to the processes of compulsory third party settlement as has
increasingly been seen in national legal and constitutional systems?20
Or should States at least not make better use of the existing processes
than they do even if the processes are voluntary?
What are the reasons for the refusal or reluctance to accept
jurisdiction in advance, or to make use of settlement methods on a
voluntary basis when a dispute arises in a legal system which, in
substantive terms, may be seen as a rather mature one? If a text has
been carefully negotiated and agreed to or if principles and
customary rules are widely accepted, what reasons are there for
resisting binding “third party” procedures? Over twenty-five years
ago, as the Cold War was ending, Grigori Tunkin, recalling what
Mikhael Gorbachev had proposed—that the P5 (permanent members
of the U.N. Security Council) should take the initiative and accept
the Court’s jurisdiction—declared that the international community
required a greater role for the Court and could not see any such
reasons.21 And if States are so reluctant to accept such procedures,
why do they try so hard to have their nationals elected to the ICJ and
other tribunals? Do they assess with equal diligence the qualities of
other candidates for election?
I take as a prime example of the need for better implementation
the law of armed conflict or international humanitarian law, one of
Grotius’ major concerns, as indicated by a passage I quoted a
19. G.A. Res. 67/1, ¶¶ 1-2 (Nov. 30, 2012) (“We recognize that the rule of law
applies to all States equally, and to international organizations, including the
United Nations and its principal organs, and that respect for and promotion of the
rule of law and justice should guide all of their activities and accord predictability
and legitimacy to their actions.”).
20. See, e.g., HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, The Problem of Jurisdictional
Immunities of Foreign States, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 220, 232-34 (1951)
(contending that foreign state immunity from the jurisdiction of national courts
should be narrowed by analogy by the changes being made in national law limiting
the immunity of the local state).
21. Grigory Tunkin, Politics, Law and Force in the Interstate System, 219
COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACAD. OF INT’L L. 227, 381-82 (1989).
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moment ago.22 Over many years the improved implementation of that
law has been at the top of many agendas. The very first Geneva
Convention of 1864 required governments to give instructions to
their Commanders in Chief to implement that Convention in
accordance with the general principles set forth in it.23 Over one
hundred years on, at the 1974-77 Diplomatic Conference which
adopted the 1977 additional protocols to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, better implementation was the subject of extensive
attention, concerning the enhancement of the role of Protecting
Powers, the role of the International Committee of the Red Cross
(“ICRC”), better dissemination and training, provisions for legal
advisers, new grave breaches, new prohibitions on reprisals,
strengthened inquiry procedures with the establishment of the
International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission (“IHFFC”),
state responsibility, and meetings of States Parties.24 To come
forward to 2003, the States Parties to the Geneva Conventions and
the National Societies at the four yearly International Conference of
the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement declared their conviction
that “the existing provisions of international humanitarian law form
an adequate basis to meet challenges raised by modern armed
conflicts . . . .”25 That was a direct rejection of the proposition, to be
heard in the previous two years that the Conventions were “obsolete”
and “quaint.”26 What was missing, declared that Conference, was
better implementation. The Conference recalled the responsibility of
States to “respect and ensure respect” for the Geneva law. One aspect
22. MacMillan et al., supra note 17, at xxxi (quoting Grotius’ Prolegomena, in
which Grotius expresses his dismay with the lawlessness of war).
23. Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 1864, Aug. 22, 1864.
24. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
arts. 4, 6, 7, 11, 20, 51(6), 52(l), 53(c), 54(4), 55(2), 56(4), 80-91, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 4.
25. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], 28th International Conference
2003: Resolution 1 (Dec. 6, 2003), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/
resolution/28-international-conference-resolution-1-2003.htm.
26. See Anthony Lewis, Introduction, in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO
ABU GHRAIB xiii, xv (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005)
(recounting that White House Counsel called the Geneva Convention’s limitations
on questioning enemy prisoners “obsolete” and other provisions “quaint” in the
context of the War on Terror).
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of the drafting history of the sentence I have just quoted gives
emphasis to its direct and clear character. An earlier version would
have said that “in general” the existing provisions formed an
adequate basis to meet the challenges raised by modern armed
conflicts. That qualifier was removed, with the U.S. government
delegation in the vanguard. The Conference, in terms of
implementation, called on all States to make use of existing
mechanisms such as Protecting Powers and the IHFFC, calls which
are also regularly made by the U.N. General Assembly but without
any appreciable concrete effect.27 The latest attempt at improving
implementation is currently undertaken by the Swiss Government
and the ICRC aimed at a text to be considered at the International
Conference held later this year.28 I do not get the sense from the
published records of the meetings of those involved that major
improvements will occur, but I would be pleased to be proven
wrong.29 Raw sovereignty raises its ugly head yet again. Would not
Grotius 400 years on be surprised by the continued emphasis on
sovereignty in such an interdependent world and by the insistence
that nationalism is back?
I recall that in 1949, the Conference which adopted the four
Geneva Conventions recommended that States consider using the ICJ
to resolve disputes about compliance with the Conventions. Such
disputes are often the subject of reservations by those States which
have accepted the Court’s jurisdiction under the optional clause, and
27. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 69/120, ¶ 3 (Dec. 18, 2014).
28. See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross [ICRC], Swiss/ICRC Initiative on
Strengthening Compliance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) (Jan. 2015)
(indicating that the ICRC-Swiss report will propose the establishment of a regular
Meeting of States to strengthen respect for the implementation of international
humanitarian law).
29. The initiative is taken in recognition of the fact that insufficient respect for
applicable rules is the principal cause of suffering during armed conflicts. The
focus of “the major consultation” over the past two years has narrowed and now
focuses on a proposed “Meeting of States as the central pillar of the future IHL
compliance system.” It would not be established by treaty and would impose no
obligations. The initial Background Document listed an extensive array of
compliance mechanisms.
See Working Group Meeting on Strengthening
Compliance with IHL, Background Document, § 2 (Oct. 2012). On the present
focus see the existing provisions of article 7 of Protocol 1 which has never been
invoked. See also the earlier Conference resolutions and actions referred to in
section 2.5 of the October 2012 Background Document. Id. at § 2.5.
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it has been said, for instance in respect of the Cuban Missile Crisis
and in the commentary following the Nicaragua case of the mid1980s, that such matters could not be justiciable. According to Dean
Acheson speaking at one of these meetings “the propriety of the
Cuban quarantine is not a legal issue . . . . [The] law simply does not
deal with such questions of ultimate power . . . .”30 But consider to
the contrary the various cases relating to nuclear weapons, the cases
about armed conflicts in the Great Lakes, the Pakistan POW case
against India, aspects of some of the cases from the Balkans, the
Iran/United States Aerial Incident case and decisions of the Eritrea/
Ethiopia tribunal. Or at a more general level, the rejection of “reason
of State” as a limit to obligation—a rejection, Lauterpacht notes,
which is achieved by Grotius without a single reference to
Machiavelli.31
In considering implementation, we should not forget
implementation through national processes which, after all,
undertake the bulk of that task day by day, particularly in mundane
or normally mundane areas such as trade, including customs and
tariffs, and communications, including post, telecommunications,
shipping, by road and by air, as well as more serious areas such as
war crimes, for instance the prosecutions in the national courts in the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and piracy. Further recall Grotius’
early advocacy in a national prize court, and the fact that he did not
draw a clear distinction between national and international law. To
return to the freedom of the high seas and to mention again a case,
the New Zealand Court of Appeal about 140 years ago decided that
New Zealand courts had no jurisdiction over an alleged murder
committed on a foreign vessel on the high seas.32 The Court was
referred to a number of eighteenth and nineteenth century authorities
including Phillimore, Vattel, Kent, and Story, some of whom cited

30. MURRAY COLIN ALDER, THE INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 131 (2013) (adding that the international community was
divided on whether the United States’ quarantine of Cuba violated international
law).
31. (1946) 23 BYIL 1, reprinted in 2 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL
LAW, THE COLLECTED PAPERS 207 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed. 1975).
32. See R v Dodd (1874) 2 NZ Jur 52 at 52-53 (CA N.Z.) (holding that without
a jurisdiction granting statute, the Court lacked the authority to try the accused).
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Grotius, but not to Grotius himself.33 That decision was not among
the many court decisions used in the S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey)34
case where the Permanent Court of International Justice reached the
opposite conclusion.35 That ruling was, of course, reversed by treaty
some years later.36

V. WELL-DESIGNED PROCEDURES
It would be wrong for me to leave an impression that I am gloomy
about the prospects of third party settlement of international disputes.
The figures alone of many matters being decided by many different
tribunals produce a positive picture, particularly if we compare the
situation fifty years ago. I have spoken on other occasions recently
about how improvements might be made to enhance the roles of
international courts and tribunals and I will not revisit those matters.
I take just one recent set of processes to illustrate a point which Lon
Fuller made here many years ago—choose your appropriate
instrument. “A sledge hammer is a fine thing for driving a stake. It is
a cumbersome device for cracking nuts . . . it is hopeless as a
substitute for a can-opener.”37 The particular matter is also to be
related back to Mare Liberum, chapter 7, since it concerns the
absolute freedom to fish on the high seas.38 Grotius based that
freedom on the inexhaustibility of high seas fisheries. The open sea
was to be contrasted with rivers—in respect of navigation as well. He
based the freedom on that fact (of nature), on many authorities
(assembled by a Spanish jurist) and on the inadmissibility of
33. Id. at 52.
34. Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7).
35. See id. at 32 (holding that the criminal proceedings under Turkish Law
against Lieutenant Demons, an officer on the Lotus who caused a collision killing
eight Turkish nationals, did not violate international law).
36. See Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Penal
Jurisdiction in Matters of Collision or Other Incidents of Navigation, art. 1, May
10, 1952, 439 U.N.T.S. 233 (stating that in the event of a collision, only the
judicial authorities of the state whose flag the ship was flying under may institute
criminal proceedings).
37. Lon L. Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 54 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 1, 1 (1960).
38. See HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS OR THE RIGHT WHICH
BELONGS TO THE DUTCH TO TAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN TRADE 51-52 (James
Brown Scott ed., Ralph van Deman Magoffin trans., 1916) (“[I]t is a universal law
that the sea and its use is common to all.”).
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prescription or custom or express law to defeat such a freedom. But
the facts have long been different. Fisheries are not inexhaustible.
John Maynard Keynes has an apt comment, as on so many matters,
“[w]hen my information changes, I alter my conclusions. What do
you do, sir?”39 No doubt Grotius would agree. A sixth lesson I
suggest.
My example of well-designed processes for the ongoing
management of fisheries as well as the settlement of disputes relating
to those fisheries comes from the South Pacific Ocean. The fisheries
in that area have long been under serious threat. Some species were
protected in some degree but until recently there was no overall
management regime. Over the last decade, the South Pacific
Regional Fisheries Management Organisation has been established.40
In the preamble of the Convention on the Conservation and
Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the South Pacific
Ocean (“South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management
Convention”), the Parties express their commitment to ensuring the
long-term conservation and sustainable use of the fisheries resource
in the South Pacific Ocean and in so doing safeguarding the marine
ecosystems in which the resources occur.41 The Parties and the
institutions they create are to apply a precautionary approach as well
as an ecosystem approach—approaches which are broadly defined in
the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Convention.42
Grotius would, I imagine, have been intrigued at the use of the word
“approach” as opposed to “rule,” “principle,” or even “standard,” and
the cautious attitude of the ICJ to that matter.
In the drafting of the South Pacific Regional Fisheries
Management Convention, procedures were established for the annual
fixing of the total allowable catch and of quotas for fishing
countries.43 The procedures emphasize decision-making by
consensus but allow for majority voting if consensus cannot be
39. Paul A. Samuelson, The Keynes Centenary, in THE COLLECTED SCIENTIFIC
PAPERS OF PAUL A. SAMUELSON 275, 275 (Kate Crowley ed., 1983).
40. Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery
Resources in the South Pacific Ocean, Nov. 14, 2009, U.N. treaty registration no.
50553.
41. Id. art. 20.
42. Id. art. 3.
43. Id. art. 16.
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attained.44 States could object on prescribed grounds and a dispute
settlement process, which was to operate expeditiously, was
arranged. I should add another element to this picture. When the
negotiations were underway, Peru brought ICJ proceedings against
Chile for the delimitation of their maritime boundary. There was
nothing in the record before the Court to indicate that oil was an
issue, fisheries were in part covered by existing arrangements, the
South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Convention, although
not mentioned, was being negotiated and was beginning to be
applied, and there were security and customs interests as well as the
long history running back at least to the War of the Pacific. The
Court delivered its judgment in early 2014, more than a year after the
end of the oral argument, the longest period in my time on the Court.
What, you may well ask, was the real purpose of the Peruvian
application? I can make a guess, but judges often can do no more
than speculate about the background to and the reasons for litigating.
That judgment was given on the day the second meeting of the South
Pacific Fishing Management Commission began the task of fixing
the quotas for the next year. In the meantime, the Russian Federation
had challenged a measure adopted at the first meeting, a challenge
which was heard on a Monday and the ruling in which was delivered
the following Friday by a panel chaired by a former editor of the
American Journal of International Law, in Fuller’s terms, the
operator of a clever can opener.45 A seventh lesson then is to look
across the range of possible processes which are available or may be
invented. I add the caution that available methods may simply be
ignored and that the success so far of that particular process of
management and of one instance of dispute resolution must not be
allowed to disguise the rapid depletion of many fish stocks. The
definition of “success” may be too narrow. The earlier collapse of the
jack mackerel fishery stock in the South Pacific provides one
44. Id.
45. See Objection by the Russian Federation to Decision, Findings and
Recommendations of the Review Panel, RP 98381, Review Panel Under the
Convention on Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in
the
South
Pacific
Ocean,
¶
4
(July
5,
2013),
https://pcacpa.org/en/search/?q=Objection+by+the+Russian+Federation+to+Decision%2C+F
indings+and+Recommendations+of+the+Review+Panel%2C+RP+98381%2C++R
eview+Panel+Under+the+Convention+on+Conservation+and+Management+of+H
igh+Seas+Fishery+Resources+in+the+South+Pacific+Ocean.
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spectacular example among many.

VI. THE LAW OF NATURE AND OF NATIONS
The recent development and application of the law of the sea
highlights another central characteristic of Grotius’ writing—his
sources—of the law of nature and of nations. The first once dictated
freedom of the high seas but, in fact, new fishing methods no longer
accorded with the principle and new oil extraction technology helped
generate the principle that the land dominates the sea and the
principle of the natural prolongation of the land territory into and
under the seabed. Those principles of nature (which many would
question as scientifically accurate, certainly in the case of the first)
have become principles of law. Delimitation between contiguous and
opposite states takes account of such principles but the treaty law, the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(“UNCLOS”), the law of nations in Grotius’ terms, speaks only of an
equitable result. No real criteria for reaching that result are identified
by the UNCLOS. The negotiators were unable to agree even on a
minimal statement.
Many, including members of the Court, have been critical, even
scornful, about the law on delimitation as stated in the UNCLOS and
developed by the Court. In 1982, one of the judges who had
undertaken extensive scholarly and diplomatic work on the law of
the sea declared that the Court in its judgment appeared simply to
suggest “the principle of non-principle,” a criticism he repeated three
years later in a further dissent.46 The headings in that opinion, quite
apart from the supporting text, give the flavour; misconceptions in
the
present
judgment,
misconstruction,
misapplication,
maladjustment, and misunderstanding. In the earlier case another
judge, having decided that the judgment did not provide a just
solution and had strayed into subjectivism, added a further point by
concluding his dissent in this way:
For the past ten years or so, States have been less and less inclined to
present themselves before the Court; when they have chosen voluntarily
to come, the Court must answer their request and declare the law, not
46. See Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) [1982] I.C.J.
Reps 18, 157, ¶ 1; Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiraya/Malta) [1985] I.C.J.
Reps 13, 123, ¶¶ 2-30, 71-79.
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attempt a conciliation by persuasion which does not belong to the Court’s
judicial role, as long ago defined by the Court itself.47

Those grim forebodings and criticisms have not been realized; a
steady stream of delimitation cases has continued, including four in
my time, from the Pacific, the Caribbean, and the Black Sea. Another
three have been filed in just the last eighteen months. More broadly,
the Court has dealt with many more cases in the thirty years since
those statements were made than in the preceding longer period. The
criticisms of those judges about the lack of principle and failure of
reasoning in the delimitation cases have also not been realized: the
Court has developed robust methods which in practice have led to
broadly accepted, indeed largely unanimous decisions (with the
adhoc judges concurring). Further, that body of law was recently
applied by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(“ITLOS”), the specialist body established under UNCLOS, in
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Bangladesh and
Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh v. Myanmar).48 And we
may presume that it guides States when they settle boundaries by
agreement. An eighth lesson then is to attend carefully to the
interaction of principle, rule and facts—facts which may in the end
be decisive.

VII. LARGE CHALLENGES TO INTERNATIONAL
ORDER
Many matters on the international agenda today would strike
Grotius as requiring close attention by international lawyers and
others—the threats posed by nuclear weapons, climate change,
pandemics, and natural disasters, the gross breaches of human rights,
the subject of a recent book by a U.S. lawyer who sees human rights
as being in the twilight,49 the work being done within the United
Nations on Sustainable Development Goals which the Economist
magazine sees in their present form as damagingly ambitious, as
being worse than useless,50 and the killings in armed conflicts in
47. [1982] I.C.J. Reps 143, 156.
48. See Case No. 16, Order of Mar. 14, 2012, ¶ 90, https://www.itlos.org/
fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_16/1-C16_Judgment_14_02_2012.pdf.
49. Eric A Posner, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWILIGHT (2014).
50. See
Unsustainable
Goals,
ECONOMIST
(Mar.
28,
2015),
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many parts of the world, although on the last, he would, I trust, be
challenged by Steven Pinker’s The Better Angels of our Nature.51 I
will conclude by considering, in relation to natural disasters and
pandemics, issues of legal process.
Pandemics have long been the subject of general international
regulation, while the broader matter of protection from natural
disasters has had only incidental regulation internationally. Recently,
that broader matter has become the subject of consideration at the
international level, notably by the International Federation of Red
Cross (“IFRC”) and Red Crescent Societies, the Institut de Droit
International, and the International Law Commission (“ILC”). The
texts they have developed address major issues, some of which I will
note briefly.
On the broader matter, according to a recent paper given by the
United Nations Development Programme Administrator, drawing on
work by the U.N. Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (“UNISDR”),
over the past twenty years 1.3 million people have been killed and
4.4 billion have been affected by disasters caused by natural
hazards.52 95% of the deaths occur in developing countries; by
contrast only 2% of deaths from cyclones occur in highly developed
countries.53 The UNISDR calculated in 2013 that since 2000, the
economic losses caused by floods, earthquakes, and drought amount
to $2.5 trillion.54 A United Nations/World Bank calculation is that
every dollar spent on prevention (such as seismic strengthening)
http://www.economist.com/news/international/21647307-2015-will-be-big-yearglobal-governance-perhaps-too-big-unsustainable-goals (claiming that the pursued
goals are overarching, that the process is spinning out of control, and that there is a
pervasive lack of direction for solving various world issues).
51. See generally STEVEN PINKER, THE BETTER ANGELS OF OUR NATURE:
WHY VIOLENCE HAS DECLINED (2011).
52. See Helen Clark, UNDP Administrator, Hopkins Lecture, Building
Resilience: The Importance of Prioritizing Disaster Risk Reduction (Aug. 15,
2012) (giving an example that in 2011 there were 302 disasters, which killed
30,000 people and affected 206 million people by floods, droughts, etc.).
53. See id. (stating that the majority of people exposed to disasters have less
human development, which increases the number of deaths when disasters strike).
54. See U.N. Int’l Strategy for Disaster Relief, Global Assessment Report on
Disaster Risk Reduction, From Shared Risk to Shared Value: The Business Case
for Disaster Risk Reduction, at 38-39 (2013); see also Press Release, UNISDR,
UN Warns That Economic Losses from Disasters are Out of Control and Urges
Private Sector to Reduce Risk (May 15, 2013).
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saves seven lost.55 Disease also causes many more deaths, especially
in the developing world. Malaria, for instance, kills more than
500,000 a year, mostly children in Africa, one child every minute.56
In a recent issue of the New England Journal of Medicine, Bill Gates
argues, no doubt correctly, that although epidemics and wars are
terribly costly of blood and treasure, war is taken seriously by the
politicians, at least in terms of preparations such as standing armies.57
The deaths from the recent Ebola outbreak exceed 10,000 and the
World Bank calculates the resulting harm to the three countries’
economies as at least $1.6 billion.58 And deaths from armed conflict
are far exceeded by those caused by disease.59
Attempts to regulate the international spread of diseases, to turn to
that more specific matter, have a very long history. Initially, control
was exercised by local quarantine—the forty-days ships were
required to be isolated before passengers and crew could go ashore
during the Black Death plague epidemic.
The latest International Health Regulations (“IHR”), adopted by
the World Health Organization (“WHO”) in 2005,60 have their
origins in the international response to the cholera epidemics that
overran Europe between 1820 and 1847. The epidemics led to the
International Sanitary Conference in Paris in 1851 and to the
adoption of treaties, for instance in 1903, requiring international
cooperation in meeting such epidemics.61 The WHO took over the
legislative role when it was established in 1948. Its regulations of
55. See Clark, supra note 52.
56. World Health Org. [WHO], World Malaria Report 2013, at 63 (2013);
Factsheet on the World Malaria Report 2013, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Dec. 2013),
http://www.who.int/malaria/media/world_malaria_report_2013/en/.
57. See generally Bill Gates, The Next Epidemic–Lessons from Ebola, 372
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1381, 1381 (2015).
58. Press Release, World Bank, Ebola: Most African Countries Avoid Major
Economic Loss but Impact on Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone Remains Crippling
(Jan. 20, 2015); Ebola Response Roadmap Situation Report Update, WORLD
HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 25, 2014), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/137185/
1/roadmapupdate25Oct14_eng.pdf.
59. See Gates, supra note 57, at 1381.
60. International Health Regulations (2005), art. 2, May 23, 2005, 2509
U.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter IHR 2005].
61. See International Sanitary Convention, art. 1, Jan.17, 1912, 112 L.N.T.S.
283 (requiring governments to inform other governments when “plague, cholera,
or yellow fever” has been identified in their territories).
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1951 were replaced in 1969.62
The revision of the 1969 regulations was needed to address their
limitations. In particular in recent decades, cross-border travel and
trade have increased and communication technology has developed
markedly. Over the past fifty years, for instance, the numbers of
travellers flying in and out of New Zealand has increased by a factor
of 100.63 New challenges have arisen in the control of emerging and
re-emerging infectious diseases. The world has entered an
information age in which news spreads via a multitude of formal and
informal channels.
Further, the focus in the 1969 regulations on just three diseases—
cholera, plague and yellow fever—did not address the multiple and
varied public health risks that the world faces today. In addition,
some unwarranted and damaging travel and trade restrictions had led
to a reluctance by some countries to report disease outbreaks and
other events promptly.64
I now consider some of the legal process issues arising in these
two very challenging areas. To be a little concrete, consider swine
flu, bird flu, Ebola, and SARS; and the Boxing Day tsunami (2004),
the earthquakes in Port au Prince (2010), Chile (1960 and 2010),
Kobe (1995), Fukushima (2011), Hurricane Katrina, the Russian heat
waves, Pakistani floods, the Thai floods, and recently Cyclone Pam
in the Southwest Pacific Ocean. Among the international legal
process, issues are:
The actors. Who should be developing the rules? Official or private?
Local or regional or international? An institution with general or
particular responsibilities?

62. International Health Regulations, art. 5, July 25, 1969, 764 U.N.T.S. 3.
63. Compare International Travel and Migration – ITM: Visitor Arrival Totals
(2015), STAT. N.Z., www.stats.govt.nz/infoshare/ViewTable.aspx?pxID=a062c9bb
-1213-4d83-80dc-3e4ac7533e98 (last visited Feb. 16, 2016); with International
Travel and Migration – ITM: Visitor Arrival Totals (1965), STAT. N.Z.,
www.stats.govt.nz/infoshare/ViewTable.aspx?pxID=a062c9bb-1213-4d83-80dc3e4ac7533e98 (last visited Feb. 17, 2016).
64. See generally Frequently Asked Questions About the International Health
Regulations (2005), WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/ihr/about/FAQ
2009.pdf?ua=1 (last visited Feb. 16, 2016) (stating that it is necessary to instill
confidence in countries to ensure that they report disease outbreaks in spite of
these fears).
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The character of the rules. Should they be binding or be a model or a
guideline? It is striking, for instance, that the first sentence of the
Guidelines for the domestic facilitation and regulation of international
disaster relief adopted by the IFRC reads “[t]hese Guidelines are nonbinding.”65 Similarly the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction
2015-2030 does not purport to impose legal obligations.66 By contrast,
article 66 of the IHR requires that the Director General deliver copies of
the regulations to the United Nations for registration under article 102 of
the Charter.67 The IHR are plainly binding.
The relevant principles. The third of Lauterpacht’s characteristics drawn
from De Jure Belli ac Pacis is “the affirmation of the social nature of man
as the basis of the law of nature.”68 That basic idea appears in the IHR’s
statement of purposes and scope: “to prevent, protect against, control and
provide a public health response to the international spread of disease in
ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risks, and
which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and
trade.”69

[The first and third principles are as follows:]
The implementation of these Regulations shall be with full respect for the
dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons.
The implementation of these Regulations shall be guided by the goal of
their universal application for the protection of all people of the world
from the international spread of disease.70

But the fourth principle emphasizes the sovereign rights of States
“to legislate and to implement legislation in pursuance of their health
65. Int’l Fed’n of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies [IFRC],
Introduction to the Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and Regulation of
International Disaster Relief and Initial Recovery Assistance, at 13 (2011),
http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/idrl/idrl-guidelines/.
66. See Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, UNISDR,
http://www.unisdr.org/we/coordinate/sendai-framework (last visited Feb. 16,
2016); see also Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030,
A/CONF.224/CRP.1, at 12 (June 3, 2015) (holding that the framework was to
create a conducive and enabling environment to increase commitment to the
framework).
67. See IHR 2005, supra note 60, art. 66.
68. See H. Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23 BRIT.
Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 104-05 (1946).
69. IHR 2005, supra note 60, art. 2.
70. Id. art. 3.
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policies.”71 Against that emphasis, the IHR impose important
obligations, some of them new, on States and the relevant
international organizations of capacity building, notification,
consultation, and action, including the declaration of emergencies.
These obligations are to be seen in the context of the work of the ILC
on international liability for injurious consequences arising out of
acts not prohibited by international law; and their adequacy in their
terms and in operation may well be assessed by reference to the
evaluations of the responses to the Ebola crisis. Bill Gates’
recommendations in the paper I mentioned earlier should be at the
center of this work.
The clash between humanitarian values and sovereignty has also
arisen in the work of the ILC on the protection of persons in the
event of emergencies. The purpose of the first draft articles
completed last year is to facilitate an adequate and effective response
to disaster that meets the essential needs of the persons concerned,
with full respect for their human rights. The text also affirms human
dignity and humanitarian principles and places an obligation on the
affected State to seek external assistance to the extent that the
disaster exceeds its capacities. Assistance cannot however be
provided without its consent. The draft does propose a limit on
refusal. Consent cannot be withheld arbitrarily. The requirement of
consent, says the Commission, is fundamental in international law.
That comports with the recognition that an affected state has the
primary role in respect of disaster relief. The ILC gives reasons in
support of that limit and some indication of how arbitrariness might
be shown, but it also records that some of its members were of the
view that that qualified duty was not recognized by international
law.72 The next round of State comments and reactions to the final
text should make interesting reading.
In this return to academic life, I have moved away from the
confined role of the judge—largely confined by the issues properly
arising from the legal dispute brought to the Court, by the evidence
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. See generally Int’l Law Comm’n, Protection of Persons in the Event of
Disasters, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.831, arts. 4, 14 (May 15, 2014) (finding that when
a state is offered assistance, it should make its decision on the offer of assistance
known if possible, but this is not a strict requirement).
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as presented, by the arguments made, and by the relief sought. Just
how successful I have been in looking more broadly at our
responsibilities, in looking at structures and inter-connections is for
you, for others to judge. But I have tried to emphasize process and
principle. I add to my references to Grotius and Lauterpacht one to
Karl Llewellyn for his similar emphasis: technique without morals is
a menace, but “ideals without technique are a mess.”73

73. See Karl N. Llewellyn, On What is Wrong with So-called Legal Education,
35 COLUM. L. REV. 651, 662 (1935) (noting that lawyers must first be taught to
have a strong foundational technique before proceeding to their job as a lawyer).

